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RESUMEN
El artı´culo cuestiona el grado de importancia que ha sido atribuido a la
inseguridad en los ana´lisis recientes del atraso colombiano en el siglo XIX, y del
atraso de la Ame´rica Latina en general en la post-independencia. El autor ofrece
argumentos crı´ticos a la falta de evidencia empı´rica y ausencia de un enfoque
comparativo en estos ana´lisis, tanto dentro como fuera del hemisferio. La evi-
dencia mostrada para el caso colombiano indica que ni la llamada «anarquı´a»
ni las deficiencias de los derechos de propiedad constituyeron un freno
importante al desarrollo de la economı´a del paı´s. El autor tambie´n cuestiona la
direccio´n de causalidad de las explicaciones institucionalistas.
Palabras clave: Colombia, Ame´rica Latina, desarrollo siglo XIX,
inseguridad, instituciones
«Nevertheless, in attaching to this great requisite, security of person
and property, the importance which is justly due to it, we must not
forget that even for economical purposes there are other things quite
as indispensable, the presence of which will often make up for a very
considerable degree of imperfection in the protective arrangements
of government. y a certain degree of insecurity, in some combina-
tions of circumstances, has good as well as bad effects, by making
energy and practical ability the conditions of safety. Insecurity
paralyzes, only when it is such in nature and in degree, that no
energy, of which mankind in general are capable, affords any toler-
able means of self-protection. And this is a main reason why
oppression by the government, whose power is generally irresistible
by any efforts that can be made by individuals, has so much more
baneful an effect on the springs of national prosperity, than almost
any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institutions.
Nations have acquired some wealth, and made some progress in
improvement, in states of social union so imperfect as to border on
anarchy: but no countries in which the people were exposed without
limit to arbitrary exactions from the officers of government, ever yet
continued to have industry or wealth.» (Mill 1848, ‘Of the Ordinary
Functions of Government, Considered as to Their Ordinary Effects’,
Book V, Chapter VIII).
«Battle is the suffering of a day, a month, a year; the arbitrary
maintenance of unjust legislation can be the suffering of a lifetime, of
a generation, of various generations.» (A´lvarez 1914).
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«Peace has come with all its horrors: everything has had a frightful
fall, coffee, merchandise, wages of all sorts, freight, cattley» Amalia
I.de Ma´rquez, Letter to E. de Ma´rquez, Medellı´n, 28 November 1902.
***********
This article, although it contains some empirical data, is essentially an
attempt to give more precision and definition to possible arguments about,
and approaches to, the question whether insecurity had a lot or a little to do
with the development of the Colombian economy in the 19th century. It also
contains more general reflections on the relations between insecurity and
development, or at least economic growth.
It is a polemical piece, and written to stimulate debate. It derives in part from
my reading of certain articles and books, mostly by North American academics,
which I think have been too influential in attributing the 19th century back-
wardness of other parts of the hemisphere to political disorder, and which are
coming to constitute a new orthodoxy, almost a new «black legend», one that
I think mistaken. The arguments also derive from my reading — for me a
frustrating experience — of the works of Douglass North1.
I am neither an economic historian nor an economist. My reading of
these works has been that of an ordinary historian, one with a propensity to
insist that any argument should be sustained with the necessary evidence.
Some of the methods of argument encountered, for their abandoning of
empirical investigation, remind me of the excesses of the years of «depen-
dency theory», when some — not all — thought that there was not much
point in studying the contortions of the dependent countries as everything
important was determined outside them. For example, on judicial reorga-
nizations Alan Dye writes: «The economic consequences are difficult to
measure but straightforward to describe.» (2006, p. 194). That strikes me as
contradictory: something difficult to measure cannot be that straightforward
to describe, at least not in a satisfactory manner, one suited to the demands
of economic history, a branch of the discipline usually proud of its rigour.
1 The pioneering article in this current, frequently cited, is Coatsworth (1978); the author repeats
his arguments in Coatsworth (1998). See also Engerman and Sokoloff (1997); Prados de la Escosura
(2006) follows Coatsworth in his emphasis on the destructive impact of Independence, and the same
tendency can be found in other contributions to these two volumes, in particular in the treatment of
institutions by Dye (2006). Prados de la Escosura (2009) somewhat modifies his earlier negative view.
My principal source for Douglass North is Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(North 1990). Against the Coatsworth-North line, doubts are raised in the essays in The Politics of
Property Rights. Political Instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929
(Haber et al. 2003). Further questioning of North’s views on Spanish and Spanish imperial institutions is
contained in «Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation State and Empire Building» (Irigoin
and Grafe 2006), although the possible effects on the region’s economic development of the authors’
own version of these institutions is by no means clear, and their views of the post-independence era —
«prolonged and devastating civil wars that would burden Spanish America for decades» — are cursory
and conventional. My chief concern in this article is with their views on the importance of insecurity.
The works cited naturally have a wider focus.
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And North (1990, p. 107) in a poetic moment: «We cannot see, feel, touch or
even measure institutions; they are constructs of the human mind.» It does
not seem to me that all institutions are so impalpable, and if they are so, how
is any verification of such theory possible? North himself, in the preface
to this book, warns the reader that «The history I include is illustrative,
designed to show the promise of the approach, but far from providing for the
kind of hypothesis testing that must ultimately be done.» (1990, p. vii).
My preliminary conclusion is simple: disorder and insecurity did not have
much to do with the degree of development achieved by Colombia in the
19th century. It is probable that they were no help to the progress of the
country, but they were not great hindrances. I am also sceptical about their
importance elsewhere in 19th century Latin America, and find uncertain
inspiration in the writing on this theme concerning other parts of the world.
A contrary notion exists, that war can favour economic development. It is
not new. Its first systematic defender in Europe was Sombart (1913). The
debate about the consequences of European wars was also the central theme
of Nef (1950). Nef did not support Sombart, and concluded that one of the
advantages of England in the two centuries before the industrial revolution
was that she had suffered less from war than her European rivals, but his
analysis is more impressionistic than precise.
The literature on the economic impact of international wars is surprisingly
scant, as is that on the economic consequences of the best-known civil wars,
such as the English Civil War of the 1640s and the War of Secession in the
United States. There is an old debate, one with a nice exchange of insults
but with little light shed and few conclusions reached, on the impact of the
Hundred Years War on the English economy in the 14th century, between the
heavyweights McFarlane (1962), Stone (1962) and Postan (1964). None of them
took much trouble to find any evidence, but it is worth quoting McFarlane,
who questioned «ythe dogmatic belief, inherited from the 19th century, that
wars can only be damaging to the societies engaged in them», and who criti-
cized «the preference, inspired in part by the intractable nature of the financial
evidence, for the oracular phrase, the more nebulous and commonplace the
better.» «To say, for example,» he continues, «that England had been «bled
white» by around 1314 is no substitute at all for a quantitative balance, no
matter that it would have to be a crude oney Precision may be unattainable,
but any attempt is better than such an empty phrase2.»
2 See McFarlane (1962) and Postan (1964). For an early study of the cost of an international
conflict, the Franco-Prussian War, see Giffen (1882). He scandalously concluded that the war was,
at a direct cost to both of £30 million a month, cheap, that Germany made a substantial profit, that
the capital cost was not severe, and that recovery would be rapid. «What usually happens, in fact, is
the submission by the generation which carries on a war to the quasi-necessity of bearing a large
part of the costy Individuals who suffer loss of income have often no capital which they can trench
upon, and will they nill they, must adjust their expenditure to their income. Those who have capital
will try every possible expedient to keep it from diminishing. It is in this way that war, as a rule, is so
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Another rather more serious debate — an older and a longer one,
beginning in 1861 — concerns the impact of the Thirty Years War on the
economies of Germany and the low countries, and is summarized by Rabb
(1962) and by Kamen (1968). The conclusions of both authors are tentative,
pointing to much regional and local variation — stagnation here, rapid
recuperation and even gain there –– and are supported by a wide range of
precariously founded statistics3.
On the War of Secession in the United States, some historians reach more
severe conclusions. McPherson (2008) in his review of Neely (2007) writes
that «y the Civil War wiped out two thirds of the assessed value of wealth in
Confederate states, two fifths of the South’s livestock, and more than half its
farm machinery — not to mention one quarter of the Confederacy’s white
men of military age. While Northern wealth increased by 50 per cent from
1860 to 1870, Southern wealth decreased by 60 per cent.» The U.S. civil war
destroyed the slave-based plantation economy of the South, the largest and
most efficient example of such an economy in the Americas. However, no
Colombian civil war had such a catastrophic economic denouement4.
I emphasize that this essay is focussed on the 19th century. Some of my
arguments are pertinent to the 20th century as well, and even the 21st century,
but it would be necessary to modify them in many ways to embrace the
distinct economic conditions and conjunctures of more recent times. It is
also concerned only with the impact of insecurity on the Colombian econ-
omy. If I conclude that that was marginal, it does not mean that I conclude
that insecurity was unimportant in other respects.
Here are a series of arguments.
Were Colombian insecurity and disorder exceptional? I think not. Some
historians — and among them economic historians who tend to pride
themselves on being more precise, more rigorous, more faithful to the
empirical evidence, apart from commonly more quantitative than their
ordinary colleagues — abandon all rigour when they come to contemplate
the so-called anarchy of the Latin American 19th century, and begin to write
like Thomas Carlyle wrote a century and a half ago. In a well-known essay,
Carlyle wrote of «all South America raging and ravening like one huge
dog-kennel gone rabid.» (Carlyle 1843).
Do I exaggerate when I compare the febrile rhetoric of some of the «new
institutionalists» among our economic historians with Thomas Carlyle? Present
in embryo in the pioneer essay by John Coatsworth, it reaches surprising new
(F’note continued)
quickly recovered from. A large part of the cost figures only as so much privation of those who carry
it on.» (Giffen 1882, p. 34).
3 Similar speculations on the Dutch Revolt can be seen in the chapter by Parker (1973) in
Winter, ed., (1973).
4 McPherson (2008) cites Sellers (1927) and Engerman (1971). O’Brien (1988) succinctly
resumes the literature with commentary.
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heights in the apparently sober pages of the recent Cambridge Economic History
of Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas et al. (eds) 2006).
Leandro Prados de la Escosura seems to me there to exaggerate the
prolonged nature of the negative effects of the wars of independence, as do a
number of other authors. Even Venezuela, where the conflict was much
more intense than in New Granada, recovered fairly rapidly. On the recup-
eration of an agricultural region of the country, one can consult the inge-
nious essay of the French precursor of ecology Boussingault (1849, pp. 4-7)
who observed that during the wars of independence the waters of the Lake of
Valencia had risen, owing to the recuperation of the neighbouring woods
brought about by the cessation owing to the fighting of all agricultural
activity. His translator, the Colombian General Joaquı´n Acosta, citing
observations of the geographer Colonel Agustı´n Codazzi, noted that with the
coming of peace the lake was receding again as the woods were cut down to
expand the cultivation of coffee5.
Luis Be´rtola and Jeffrey Williamson assert that Latin America «experi-
enced almost continuous war and civil strife between the 1820s and 1870sy
practically all of Latin America experienced episodes of massive and pro-
longed civil strife. In six countries, internal civil wars raged more or less
continuously for decades after independence.»6
None of this has any serious basis in empirical research — the authors do
not specify which were the six countries in continuous civil war7.
5 I owe the reference to Boussingault to Juan Martı´nez Alier. The evidence of tithes, studied by
Brungardt (1974) registers the dislocation caused by the wars of independence in Colombia, but also
the quite rapid recuperation. See also the arguments of Haber in the introduction of How Latin
America Fell Behind. Essays on the Economic History of Brazil and Mexico (Haber 1997). Brazil,
which gained its independence peacefully, does not seem to have derived any great economic
advantage from that lack of trauma, judging by her performance in the first decades of independent
national existence. Chowning (1997) concludes that Mexican agriculture did not suffer much in the
independence wars, and that it recovered rapidly.
6 Quotes from Be´rtola and Williamson (2006). These authors also detect, although without
showing much evidence for it, what they call «massive deglobalization during the lost decades of
lost growth between the 1820s and 1870s». Curious, their notion of independence as «deglobalis-
ing»: was the Spanish Empire, with all its regulations, hurdles and exclusions, really more «glo-
balized» than were its separate territories after a process that all contemporaries, those for and
those against, considered an opening up? The argument is shared by Prados de la Escosura (2006):
«openness to trade and factor inflows were reduced». Do these authors have Dr Francia’s Paraguay
in mind? Of course, independence was accompanied by dislocations and reorientations of the
region’s economies; some suffered, others benefitted. An impressionistic and at times delirious
anticipation of this sort of generalizing rhetoric is the chapter ‘The South American Way’ in Landes
(1998, pp. 310-334) Yet again one detects in these views of the post-independence decades the
persistent influence of Sarmiento’s Facundo, for all its brilliance in many ways the most lastingly
misleading work ever written in South America (Sarmiento 1845).
7 The tables of conflicts in Centeno (1997) and (2003) are not a complete or reliable source. For
example, his figures for numbers of «wars», quoted by Prados de la Escosura (2009) –– Argentina
ten, Brazil six, Uruguay and Mexico five, Chile and Peru four, Colombia three — do not appear to be
derived from any sound empirical research, and cannot be used for the comparative level of conflict
in those countries.
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This is not the place for an exhaustive critique, but their impressionistic view
ignores long spells of good commercial order, for example that which prevailed
in Argentina under Juan Manuel de Rosas, the idol of the foreign merchants and
the estancieros of Buenos Aires. The early economic history of the independent
River Plate is one of largely successful integration with the world economy8.
Venezuela under Jose´ Antonio Pa´ez, the head of what is termed the «con-
servative oligarchy», was also a country that up until the 1850s enjoyed a
reputation for stability, something like that of Chile. On Venezuela, it is worth
noting the opinion of Antonio Jose´ de Irisarri, an author who was well
acquainted not only with his native Central America, but also with Mexico and
most of South America. In the very pessimistic, and very eloquent, «Discurso
Preliminar» to his Historia crı´tica del asesinato cometido en la persona del Gran
Mariscal de Ayacucho — a good source, let it be said in passing, of Carlyle-like
laments about the defects of formerly Spanish America when compared to the
United States — he writes that «Venezuela and Chile are the only countries of this
continent in which it has been seen that men have tried not to waste their time in
useless questions, but to occupy themselves in what is most convenient; none-
theless it cannot be doubted that the progress of Chile has been greater than that
of Venezuela, perhaps because the Venezuelans have been more impatient and
have wanted to force nature to produce in a shorter time than is necessary results
that inevitably take their time.» (Irisarri 1846, pp. 19-20). I cite him here because
along with Chile he singles out Venezuela, the region that suffered more than
any other in the independence wars. Nor is it correct for New Granada to speak
of «massive and prolonged civil strifey more or less continuous civil war.»9
The intoxication with disorder assumes various forms in the new orthodoxy.
The first is that the adepts have an impressionistic way with numbers,
uncritically adding together coups, revolts and irregular changes of govern-
ment with no regard for their distinct natures — insecurity is, for example,
not the same as irregularity — or for their real importance or lack of
importance. This is a common vice in the cases of Mexico, Colombia and
Bolivia. The confusion between insecurity and instability is particularly
present in those who write about the first-half century of independent
Mexico. In the Colombian case, we are all familiar with the figures of Gustavo
Arboleda and others: nine national conflicts and sixty local revolts in the course
of the century, but such counts give no indication about their seriousness10.
8 See Brown (1979) and Schmit (2004). Schmit in his close analysis of Entre Rios in the decades
after independence does not find a lack of growth due to disorder, but like most who write on this
theme he is more precise about the growth than about the disorder.
9 See also the study by Banko (1990) and Gil Fortoul (1909, chapter 4). In the first decades of
her independent existence Venezuela was the scene of intense juridical debates about the laws of
credit and bankruptcy. Meanwhile, with the usual fluctuations following the cycles of the external
markets, her foreign trade grew, particularly with the export of coffee.
10 Alvaro Matute has reminded me that many of those who wrote under the Porfiriato
were tempted to exaggerate the disorders of that time: avant nous le de´luge. Arboleda (1907) counts
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A second mistake — or omission — in the argument of lack of growth
through insecurity is to consign to complete oblivion what passed in other parts
of the world. Although the 19th was not the most violent or conflictive century in
the history of Europe — the 17th and the 20th surpass it in those respects — it
was far from being an era of perpetual peace: it begins with some 15 years of
Napoleonic warfare, with great destruction and loss of life, particularly of
French lives. And consider France for the rest of the century: revolutions with
varying degrees of violence in 1830, 1848, 1851 and 1870, the last combined
with foreign invasion and the Paris Commune. France was a country that
without doubt suffered more insecurity and disorder than Chile.
In the Americas, the longest civil war and the one most destructive in lives
and property was the War of Secession in the United States. One is struck by
how little has been written on the effects of these events on the economic
history of these two countries, France and the United States11.
The question then arises of the possibly distinct quality of these violences
and insecurities. In what I have read of the «new institutionalists», I detect
an implicit notion that there is something particularly pernicious, when it
comes to economic development, in Latin American disorder, compared
with disorder in other parts of the world. Clearly, the impact of a war, the
possibilities of subsequent rapid recovery, may well be quite different in the
cases of a rudimentary, «traditional», rural economy of primary producers
and of an industrialized one. One thinks of the rapid recovery after the
Second World War of Germany and Japan, although the advantage in rapid
recovery does not seem to me to rest clearly with advanced industrial
economies: rapid recovery can be seen in many more primitive economies, as
Mill asserted and as can be seen in Colombia in the 19th century. The
question deserves more study.
Regarding the recent successes of many Asiatic economies, it might be
argued that there the Second World War had positive results, bringing «creative
destruction», and that the fault of the Latin American wars of the 19th century
was that they were not sufficiently destructive, that they did not go far enough in
destroying the old structures that the neo-institutionalists deplore. If that was
the case, then their arguments about the negative influence of disorder need to
be modified. There are traces of such an argument in Coatsworth (2006, p. 271):
«y warfare that followed independence contributed to undermining the colo-
nial institutional legacy that had inhibited economic growth and thus acceler-
ated the creation of a more efficient economic organization throughout Spanish
America.» Alas, apparently it did not accelerate it sufficiently. The reader is
urged to conclude that the institutions of Latin America are perverse when the
(F’note continued)
54 local revolutions; and the general revolutions, including those that gave birth to New Granada in
1830, usually add up to nine; there is another list in Deas and Gaita´n Daza (1995, p. 201).
11 For the United States, see the references in note 2, above.
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region is stable, as under the Empire, and perverse when it is unstable, as in the
post-independence years. Such a conclusion is not logically impossible, but it
does lead one to suspect these authors of bias.
Another trap is the indiscriminate surveying of «Latin America». As has been
seen with Thomas Carlyle, it is all too easy to generalize condescendingly about
a score of distant countries, where it is probable that things are going badly in at
least one or two. However, anyone can gather from the reading of a manual of
the economic history of the region, from Glade (1969) or Bulmer-Thomas
(2003), that some countries achieved much more growth than others, that
Argentina and Uruguay, for example, ended the 19th century with per capita
income five or six times higher than Colombia. All the same, it would not be so
easy to demonstrate that these comparatively successful republics had enjoyed
greater order and security than the suffering tropical republic of Colombia12.
A further error, or possible source of error, is the tendency to assume that
the direction of causation is from disorder to lack of development, rather
than the other way round. It is clear that economic recessions, which fre-
quently had their origin outside the country, increased the proclivity for civil
war, weakening governments and increasing the numbers of those disposed
to go to war. Recognizing this pattern ought to lead to a less severe judge-
ment of native institutions13.
This problem of the direction of causation is also applicable to the
institutionalist argument in a more fundamental way. It is by no means
always clear as to what exactly institutionalists are referring to — a historian
is likely to be puzzled by a reference to an era or country of «weak institu-
tions», without more specification, as the term is used so widely and in such
different senses, encompassing anything from systems of land tenure to the
ethnic divisions of a population. But some particular institutions obviously
cost money: poor countries cannot afford elaborate judicial systems, or high
12 An arsenal of primitive comparative statistics, doubtless many of them of dubious solidity,
designed to show Colombia’s backwardness relative to the rest of the neighbourhood, is Aguilar
(1884). For the Argentine case, A´lvarez (1914) has the great merit of describing the connections
between these wars and the economic interests of the different regions of the country, and of
relating them with the development of the national economy. A similar exercise in the Colombian
case would not be so easy, given the relative lack of economic antagonisms between the regions and
the absence of economic motives among the causes of conflict — an exception would be divergent
views on slavery, which have something to do with the war of 1851. Nonetheless, A´lvarez’s book is a
corrective to the view of Latin American civil wars as economically entirely negative. Some wars
decided issues, sometimes in favour of the side that promised a country greater economic dyna-
mism. Such was, it appears to me, the case with the victory of Mosquera over Ospina in 1862, a war
in which there were certain differences in economic doctrine between the contenders — see the
polemics of William Wills in Deas (1996, vol. 2).
13 For a fuller exploration of the cycle, see Deas (1993, chapter ‘Poverty, Civil War and Politics:
Ricardo Gaita´n Obeso and his Magdalena River Campaign in Colombia, 1885’). See also A´lvarez
(1914, p. 153): «Las crisis europeas, arrastrando el capital que ambula por el mundo en busca de
intereses elevados, nos hieren, pues, de lleno. Casi todas ellas guardan evidente relacio´n con las
perturbaciones argentinas, anticipa´ndoseles un pocoy».
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levels of policing, or clearly competent armed forces. Such things may well
be as much the product as the cause of economic development.
For all these reasons we can conclude, in this preliminary phase of ana-
lysis, that it is not at all obvious that disorder and insecurity, in the most
visible form of civil war, explain the backwardness, slow growth and relative
lack of progress of the 19th century Colombian economy.
It is of course easy to find contemporary Colombian writers deploring the
wars and insecurity and attributing to them the lack of national progress, but
political rhetoric has to be distinguished from more sober analysis14.
Here follow some simple observations on the nature of «anarchy» in
Colombia. The civil wars were relatively short. Even in the case of those
wars usually considered national rather than regional, not all of them
involved all the territory. The armies were small — neither the government
nor the revolution had the wherewithal to organize large armies, and it was
very difficult to sustain large concentrations of troops. Although there are
exceptions — remember Ruanda — it is difficult to make waste on a grand
scale or carry out large massacres with small and dispersed forces. The worst
behaviour of the contenders generally took place in remote and sparsely
populated parts (see Garavito 1897, p. 70).
For obvious reasons, it is not easy to establish reliable statistics for the losses
in the various civil wars of the 19th century. Even where they exist, con-
temporary estimates vary from side to side, and there is no way of knowing how
many perished through disease, change of climate, etc. Garavito, calculated the
civil war dead up until then at 40,000 (1897, p. 41). Faute de mieux, I repeat faute
de mieux, Gaita´n Daza (1995, p. 201) gives the following approximations:
1830-1831: 1,800
1839-1841: 3,366
1851: 1,000
1854: 2,000
1860-1862: 6,000
1876-1877: 9,000
1884-1885: 3,000
1895: 2,000
1899-1902: 80,000
14 For samples of such lamentations, see the quotes in Fischer (2001) — Fischer acknowledges
the authority and inspiration of Douglass North. The theme was touched on by nearly all the
prominent publicists of the century, one of the best contributions being Ospina Rodrı´guez (1842).
Salvador Camacho Rolda´n described the retrograde effects of a war as the construction of «a
Ferrocarril del Norte towards the past» — that railway being the grand project of the time. William
Wills echoed him. (Nonetheless, Wills, as we have noted, was an enthusiast of the rebel side in the
war of 1860). Among academics, the honour of being the pioneer in the study of the subject must go
to Garavito (1897). Garavito’s thesis contains quantitative exercises of surprising sophistication for
the time, on lost production, income lost through deaths and disablement, physical destruction etc.,
etc.
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He rightly points out that these numbers are the more significant in pro-
portion to the small population of the country in those years, notably in the
cases of the wars of 1876-1877 and of 1899-1902 — «equivalents for 1992» of
27,000 end even 200,000 in the years of worst intensity, respectively. But the
total is modest, especially if the last war, the War of a Thousand Days, which
according to these figures killed three times as many men as all the others put
together, is left out. Although it was the longest and probably the most
intensely fought, the figure for the Thousand Days does not look very plau-
sible to me. It is the sum of estimates of 10,000 for 1899, and 25,000 each for
1900 and 1901, and 10,000 is obviously excessive for 1899, as the war only
began in the middle of October of that year. Contemporary estimates for the
wars vary: Gaita´n’s figure for the Thousand Days (i.e. 80,000) is the same as
the contemporary estimate of Holguı´n (1908); there are others, higher and
lower. There is little agreement, for example, on the number of deaths in the
Battle of Palonegro, the largest encounter of the whole war: Arboleda Corte´s
(1901) gives as bajas de sangre — presumably dead and wounded — 1,600 on
the government side and 3,200 on the side of the revolution. Florez A´lvarez
(1939), in a careful later account, gives 2,000 Liberals dead and woundedy
Note that the War of a Thousand Days, which began in October 1899, for
elementary reasons of chronology cannot be held responsible for the back-
wardness of the preceding century.
In general, a degree of discipline was maintained in these wars: the social
hierarchy was in great part preserved in the course of these conflicts. A
temptation to be avoided is to emphasize the worst, or according to taste the
more radical or extreme or lethal in the wars: the social struggles in the Valle
del Cauca at mid-century, the burning of Colo´n by Pedro Presta´n in 1885, the
guerrilla warfare at the end of the War of a Thousand Days15.
Neither should one be lead astray by contemporary European and North
American observers who with the racial and cultural prejudices of their time
characterized South American conflicts as particularly savage. They appear to
them necessarily, unquestionably more savage than their own regular wars;
perhaps they unconsciously exclude colonial affairs. There is possibly an ele-
ment of truth here, for the majority were civil wars, with the logic of civil wars:
see the analysis of internal conflicts in Kalyvas (2006). There is always some
savagery in irregular war, and civil wars are never entirely regular — there was
much irregularity in the U.S. civil war. Nonetheless, even Joseph Conrad,
15 Valle del Cauca suffered from particularly acute problems of isolation and racial division,
well described in the pamphlets of the 1850’s by Ramo´n Mercado and others, and in the 1880 travel
narrative of von Schenk (1953). von Schenk contrasts the sufferings and poverty of Valle with the
prosperity of Antioquia, and he himself stresses that Valle was exceptional: «This was the only part
of Colombia where I heard talk of insecurity on the roads (in time of peace)» (1953, p. 55). His view
can be supplemented by more systematic recent studies, such as Hyland (1983), Valencia Llano
(1993) and Valencia Llano, (ed.) (1996); see also Pacheco (1992) and Sanders (2004). On Presta´n,
Palacio (1936), and on the guerrillas of the Thousand Days, Jaramillo Castillo (1991).
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a European of broad sympathies, exaggerates the savagery of South American
fighting in Nostromo and Gaspar Ruiz. The Carlist wars in Spain itself appear to
me to have been more intense, more bloody, than the Colombian wars of the
same era — and Spain appears less secure and stable in the 19th century than
many American republics, although I have yet to read a Spanish economic
historian who attributes Spanish economic backwardness primarily to this
insecurity and instability. In international relations, Colombia in the 19th cen-
tury and up until today has been a markedly pacific country: the exceptions have
been a few skirmishes with Ecuador and Venezuela, which never amounted to
wars, and one short war with Peru. The loss of Panama, the republic’s worst
trauma, was not the result of international war.
There are many contemporary memoirs of civil war, by rebels and defen-
ders of governments, and the essentially civilian character of most of their
authors prevents them from writing formal military history, so that they
frequently contain first-hand accounts of their experiences free from the dis-
tortions of professional vanity. My impression is that the degree of violence in
19th century Colombia was a low one, much lower than the violence of the
second half of the 20th century. In the 19th century, there was much less of the
unbridled, uncontrolled sectarian conflict that was to be the dominant note in
Colombia in the 1940s and 1950s, with a prelude in the early 1930s16.
I wish to emphasize, faced with the rhetoric of certain economic historians,
that «anarchy» and «turmoil» are potentially analysable and quantifiable phe-
nomena, and that they are notions that need definition. A scale of gravity could
be designed for insecurity, something along the lines of the Beaufort scale for
tempests or the Richter scale for earthquakes, which would go from a small riot
or bochinche, the Colombian term, force 1, to the total war in the closing stages
of the Second World War, force 10. On such an imagined scale it would be my
opinion that Colombia would only rarely have reached force 2 or 3.
What of property rights in Colombia in the 19th century? What is the
evidence for their deficiencies and faults, and the consequences for economic
development?
Those who paint a picture of general anarchy have forgotten that the
Spanish Empire was one of the most formidable bureaucracies the world has
known, and that not all of that was lost with independence. The notarial
and registry system, notariado y registro, which was implanted from the
very beginnings of the Conquest, persists in its essentials up to the present
day. Doubtless it had its defects, but its coverage was always extensive. I do
not share John Coatsworth’s view, (2006, p. 60), that land registry did not
exist: «land registries were unknown y» That they had their defects is one
thing, but to assert that they did not exist is undoubtedly an error, nor is it so
16 For a sample, Martı´nez de Nisser (1983); Cuervo (1902), on the civil war of 1859-1862. There
are references to a number of other works on the war of 1885 in Deas (1993), and to some of the
memoirs of the Thousand Days War in Deas (2001) in Sa´nchez and Aguilera (eds) (2001).
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clear that they were inadequate. Furthermore, in the developed world, the
systems of land title and registry have varied a great deal — the English
system shares few characteristics with the French, for example. The devotion
of Colombians of all classes to official stamped paper, papel sellado, to
solemnize transactions only died recently, and the system of notariado y
registro remains in good health and continues to expand17.
The existence of a legal infrastructure of this nature is not a proof of the
security of property rights, but it is an indication that not everything is
chaotic, and if it served no purpose people would not have had recourse to it,
nor were its limitations always so clearly a significant obstacle to growth.
One of the most common was the imprecision in land titles, a frequent
source of conflict. However, those conflicts occur in times and in regions of
economic expansion, for example the sustained expansion of coffee culti-
vation from the 1860s to the 1920s18.
An argument has recently been made that these conflicts could have reduced
the possible offer of Colombian coffee by as much as half. I confess that I find
that conclusion, the product of a process of deduction without any hard
empirical evidence, precarious and improbable. It is well known that various
conflicts accompanied coffee expansion, but I see no evidence that it was sig-
nificantly slowed by supposed legal deficiencies, in titles or property rights. The
law that governed its rhythms and limits was the law of supply and demand in
the world market, not Colombian law and its supposed imperfections, and its
application in the tribunals of Santander, Cundinamarca, Tolima and Antioquia
(see Sa´nchez Torres et al. 2010)19.
17 An introduction to the Colombian system, with a list of the existing archives, is Garzo´n
Mun˜oz and Morato (1960).
18 See one early analyst of the Colombian economy, the Precursor Antonio Narin˜o, who in his
Ensayo sobre un nuevo plan de administracio´n en el Nuevo Reino de Granada of 1797 made the
following denunciation: «One of the most destructive plagues of this Kingdom is the mania of
litigation, which together with the slowness and complication of the cases and the exorbitant
charges of the escribanos, etcetera, are a great drain on the fortunes of the citizens. Nothing is more
common than to see a proprietor abandon his lands, make a journey of twenty or thirty days to the
court, and hang around for years at the doors of the tribunals and so eat up the profits of the lands
he has in cultivation to litigate over some other uncultivated extension that neither he nor his sons
have the means of cultivating. Who would believe it, if he did not see it with his own eyes, that where
nothing is more in surplus than land, the majority of the litigation is over bits of land? Every day we
see another case begin over the boundaries of some lands, and one that will destroy both the honour
and the fortune of the litigants.» (Vergara y Vergara (1946, p. 88)). Irrational conduct? Narin˜o
exaggerates? Before the reader concludes that this quotation supports conclusions of the school of
North, I refer him or her to the remarks below on property rights and the expansion of coffee.
19 A recent contribution to the extensive literature on the history of coffee in Colombia is Acero
Duarte (2007). He shows that the notorious conflicts of Viota´, for long the rural fortress of the
Colombian Communist Party, did not halt investment in coffee, and it remains the leading coffee
producer of the Department of Cundinamarca. The author also supplies some rare details of the
financing of some of the haciendas at the close of the 19th century: they received advances against
the harvest from English and European import houses at relatively modest interest.
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I have doubts about the use of «surrogates» in the formation of their
models by some recent historians of the Colombian economy. They are
certainly aroused in the case of the speculations about the effect on exports
of conflicts in the coffee zone in Sa´nchez Torres et al. (2010). For the variable
«conflict», they use the disputes over land, mostly from the archives relating
to baldı´os, registered in LeGrand (1986). But those conflicts could have been
large or small, and may or may not have affected the production and pro-
ductivity of the place concerned: Le Grand’s book and other sources indicate
that the degree of conflict varied a great deal. Without much more about the
nature of each dispute, it is unsafe and unconvincing to treat them as a
uniform variable in a speculative exercise on the possible quantity of
exportable product. Neither can one reach the conclusion from a careful
reading of Le Grand that all these conflicts were lost by the small colonos, as
is posited by the model in question: the coffee zones, as is notorious, contain
many small and medium-sized producers — see the observations on land
policies in Melo (2007, pp. 156 et seq.) in Ocampo (2007). It is also not clear
whether the multiplication of small properties would have increased expor-
table production: a preliminary hypothesis would be that in the era of
expansion it was favoured by a mixture of large and small properties. It is not
shown whether the number of conflicts was so large, and the statistics confirm
what is known from other sources, that they became more numerous and
widespread in the 1920s and 1930s, not in the principal years of expansion, still
less in the 19th century. The classic contemporary work of Rivas (1899), which
the authors do not cite, does not mention conflicts in the coffee zones, although
it does mention them in the tobacco-growing area of Ambalema; that is of
course no proof that there were none, but if they had been so important an
obstacle to production they would certainly have left more contemporary evi-
dence, more protest and commentary, as did those of the 1920s. The authors
pass over problems as important as lack of capital and shortage of labour,
Colombian costs of production and transport, fluctuations in the world
markets — all are sacrificed on the altar of a neo-institutionalist analysis –– to
reach the conclusion that «without conflicts the production of exportables
would have been at least the double of that observed.»
I do not think that the expansion of coffee suffered from failings in
property rights; rather, with the multiplication of small and medium hold-
ings, it can be argued that more Colombians came to enjoy such rights20. Nor
had such defects hindered the earlier rise of tobacco cultivation — litigation
over land does not figure prominently in that history, although there were
20 See the arguments in Nugent and Robinson (2010, p. 50): «y both Colombia and Costa Rica
passed laws rather like the 1862 Homestead Act in the United States, protecting smallholders and
allowing them to gain title to land.» Nugent and Robinson see positive institutional consequences
deriving from political rivalry within the Colombian elite, despite the frequency of armed conflict.
Their speculations are based on the well-known works of Ospina Va´squez, (1955), Safford (1965),
Palacios (1980), Hyland (1983) , LeGrand (1986) and others.
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difficulties in the enforcement of share-cropper contracts. The export of
quinine bark caused conflicts in certain parts, particularly in Santander —
«quina wars» in the baldı´os, state lands that were the subject of competing
claims. All the same, legal deficiencies did not hinder the rise of either of
these exports, nor do they account for their decline: compared with other
causes, their effect was marginal.
Economic historians of the institutional school ought to have more
respect for what the great English jurist William Blackstone (1765-1769)
referred to as «the robust title of occupancy». It was the title recognized for a
certain extension of land in the laws on the appropriation of baldı´os, and it is
a notion that must be current in all frontier societies. Many colonizers were
interested in legalizing, registering and perfecting their titles at a certain
stage, but they did not necessarily make this a fetish, a sine qua non of their
entrepreneurial activity.
Let us look at other possible insecurities. Two of them derive from leg-
islation that was at least in part designed to encourage economic progress,
that concerning Indian reserves, the resguardos, and that concerning church
property. In both cases, property rights can be said to have been violated,
although they were not individual property rights. Neither example seems to
me of great importance in 19th century economic development in general. A
proportion, far from the totality, of the resguardos disappeared, without
giving the positive impulse to rural development that Liberal theory expected
and with what are commonly regarded as negative consequences for the
indigenas concerned. The church properties in Colombia did not amount to
so much, and so far it has not been shown that the desamortizacio´n had any
marked effect on the economic activity of the country21.
The basic security of the proprietor is not to suffer robbery or expro-
priation. Some commentators think that robbery and expropriation were
common features of the civil wars, but this is too simple.
Without doubt, the civil wars were in many ways damaging. It is not the
argument of this essay to deny the generally negative effects of disorder, but to
be more precise about the importance or lack of importance of those negative
effects, and to examine critically the argument that disorder was a principal
cause of the poor record of the Colombian economy in the 19th century.
It is necessary to examine the evidence, much more closely than it has
been examined by those who refer too lightly to «anarchy» and «turmoil»,
and evidence does exist, from various sources. Concerning basic property
rights, as in all wars there were expropriations and robberies. But in the case
of expropriations there were limits. The typical cases were of cattle and
21 Meisel Roca and Jaramillo (2008) nonetheless maintain that the desamortizacio´n had a
positive impact, from the fiscal point of view, on the development of banking. If that was indeed the
case, then the measure could be catalogued as a beneficial result of civil war, as it was the recourse
of a victor desperate for fiscal resources, General Mosquera.
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horses, for rations and for mobility. Seizing cattle was commonplace: «Viva
la guerra, muera el ganado!» This caused no surprise, and hacendados would
routinely hide their animals as best they could, as well as attempting to
protect their peons from being recruited. All the wars reduced the stock of
cattle, sometimes in certain parts drastically, as in the Llanos during the
Thousand Days22. The practice was regulated, and the regulations set out in
the Co´digo militar. Expropriators were meant to give out chits, which would
in theory be paid after the government victory. Papers that were not worth
much, but were better than nothing23.
All the same, the detail is significant in relation to property rights. In the
republican era, it was neither licit nor common to expropriate real property.
The lands and real property of Spanish royalists was expropriated in the wars
of Independence, but this was not the practice in the later civil wars. There
are examples of explicit prohibition of the practice, as in the Constitution of
the Estado Soberano de Santander of 1859. Exceptions did occur, and some
can be found in the war of 1877 — the general repudiation was strong
enough to produce prompt reversal in the examples I have encountered, and
the restoration of the properties concerned to their original owners. There is
a detailed account of one such episode in that war, the expropriation and
auction of some rural and urban Conservative properties in Pasto, carried
out by Liberals under the orders of the Radical Cesar Conto, which excited
general opposition and which was reversed on the orders of another Liberal,
the less Radical General Eliseo Paya´n24.
This type of expropriation could not gain acceptance as part of the rules
of the game. In a country of such political instability, it was not advisable to
go too far in chastising the enemy. Everyone in the upper and even middle
22 Curious details in Castro Chaquea (1986, pp. 50 et seq.): «In the civil war (of 1899-1902) the
cattlemen of San Juan suffered their herds being much reduced for rationing the troops, but the
major cause of the losses in cattle are to be attributed to the lack of salt, the herds were reduced by
50-60%.»
23 The jurisprudence and practice in the aftermath of the war of 1877 of the Corte Federal, the
country’s supreme court, has been studied in detail in Arenas Mendoza (2007); his appendix con-
tains a generous selection of claims for supplies and expropriations, with the decisions of the Court.
The majority concern horses and cattle, and the sums demanded are modest. The decisions of the
Court seem to me well considered and just: sometimes payment is refused for lack of evidence,
claims for payment of interest are rejected, but the Court proceeds on the local presumption of
sincerity — verdad sabida y buena fe guardada — and its sentences were published. Further details of
expropriations in Ortiz Mesa (2004). I owe the reference to Arenas Mendoza’s thesis to Dr Ortiz. For
regulations, see, for example, Co´digo Militar expedido por el Congreso de los Estados Unidos de
Colombia (Bogota´ 1881, pp. 206 et seq.).
24 Guerrero Rinco´n et al. (eds) (2004): the Santander state constitutions contain various articles
that expressly limit expropriation in times of civil war: «The derecho de gentes — international law —
is part of state law in relation to civil war. Consequently, civil war can be ended by treaty between
the belligerents, who must respect the humanitarian practices of civilized Christian nations... The
lives of prisoners are inviolable and nobody has the power to alienate , on the pretext of forced loan or
war contribution, the real property of citizens.» (my italics). For the federal legislation, see the thesis
of Arenas Mendoza (2007). For the Pasto case, see Guerrero (1922, pp. 87 et seq.).
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reaches of politics was aware that the winner of today might well be the loser
of tomorrow, and this awareness produced at least a degree of prudence.
What of expropriation in the guise of forced loans? In the Memorias of the
Ministers of Hacienda who served during and after civil wars, one can study
in detail the measures taken to meet the extraordinary expenses they occa-
sioned, and among these measures the voluntary and forced loans, with the
lists of names of the lenders, willing — speculative — and unwilling, and the
sums involved against each name25.
There was some order in these proceedings. The section on the last civil
war in the Memoria of 1878 begins with the rejection by the federal gov-
ernment of a petition from the Radicals of the Cauca — the first signature is
that of General David Pen˜a, a Radical of particularly fierce reputation ––
demanding that a fine of three million pesos, to be spent on the Ferrocarril
del Pacı´fico, be exacted from the godos of Antioquia, according to them those
principally responsible for starting the war. The response of the Secretary of
Hacienda was that this would be neither legal nor advisable, and that he
deplored any notion of confiscation or collective punishment: what was
important was to restore peace, not to exacerbate the feelings of the defeated
with that sort of economic vengeance26.
Forced loans were a measure of fiscal emergency, the end being to get
resources rapidly. The victims were commonly the disaffected and the
opponents of the government — from its supporters the government expec-
ted support too, supplies in kind, cattle and horses, or voluntary loans that
after hostilities ended would receive preferential attention. With the forced
loans, the government offered discounts for prompt payment, up to half the
sum demanded. At times, it announced that it was forbidden to seek
reductions, but it appears that deals were done, above and below board, as
was logical given the urgency of raising funds. The recalcitrant were threa-
tened with having their goods auctioned off, or with imprisonment, although
these threats were rarely carried out. In the list of names and amounts for the
Cundinamarca forced loan in the Memoria of 1878, there are some exactions
above $1,000, but the majority are much lower: for 1876, the average for the
113 contributors named was $336. The total raised up to the end of the fiscal
emergency in July 1877, according to the marvellously precise accounts of
25 For example, «Documentos relacionados con la u´ltima guerra civil», in Bernal (1878). In this
Memoria, the ravages of the last war appear from time to time, but the picture presented of the
national economy and finances is not one of disaster. Bernal calculated that as a consequence of the
civil war the customs revenue, the principal item of government income, had suffered a diminution
of one-third in the fiscal year, but the recovery had been rapid: «y once the war was over, either
from the strength of the elements of vitality always present in new countries [perhaps he had been
reading John Stuart Mill], or as a result of the Government0s efforts, the situation has got con-
siderably better, and thanks to that it has been possible to think of carrying forward the material
improvements on which the economic future of the country depends.»
26 Pen˜a was held responsible for the notorious sack of Cali on 24 December 1876. See von
Schenk (1953).
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the Memoria, was $132,350 and seventy centavos from the forced loans,
$86,616 and twenty centavos from voluntary loans and from voluntary
contributions $85,099 and forty centavos. Thus, in this part of the country,
the government raised more from its friends than from its enemies (Bernal
1978, pp. 47-61).
Even without formal expropriation, did politics and conflict influence the
lot of proprietors in the 19th century, to a degree that had a marked impact
on the development of the economy? This is not a problem that has received
careful study. The behaviour of most substantial property owners in times of
conflict was prudent — there is plenty of evidence to indicate that the
majority tried not to get much involved. It is well known from studies of 20th
century episodes of violence that in certain parts property in land, particu-
larly medium-sized property, was affected, but up to now there is little
evidence from the 19th century27.
How this might have affected development is a further question. We
should again recall that Colombia became one of the world’s principal coffee
producers between 1870 and 1920, a half century that saw four of the so-
called national wars: 1876-1877, 1885, 1895 and 1899-1902.
Another approach is to examine the vulnerability of the different sectors of
the economy, as has already been sketched for cattle. The principal exports of
the country in the century were gold, tobacco, quinine and coffee. None of these
was particularly vulnerable to disorder, at least in the medium or long term.
Let us look at mining. For the purposes of this analysis, the sector can be
divided into three categories: the large Antioquen˜o mines and a couple of
Tolima enterprises, the Cauca and Choco´ mines worked by slaves, and small
placer mining. The large Antioquia mines and the placer mining there and
elsewhere did not suffer much from conflict. Antioquia in general suffered
less than other parts of the country, and was a region resistant to militar-
ization: recruiting troops there was notoriously difficult, partly for the good
prospect of gains and employment in small mining. Marmato and Supia,
mining districts on the frontier between Antioquia and Cauca, were regarded
as less secure, but this did not have a decisive effect on their development28.
27 Ortiz (1985) and Atehortu´a (1995). These works contain examples from the mid-20th century
of what Karl Marx might have labelled «primitive accumulation», in both cases of coffee lands
acquired through violent means by local caciques, middle range entrepreneurs. No doubt some
similar primitive accumulation occurred in the nineteenth century, and there are examples of
settlements founded by colonizers who had been forced to leave their previous lands by political
persecution: Gramalote, Norte de Santander, is one such — but 19th century evidence remains scant.
There does not seem to have existed any large class of persons enriched by civil war, or ruined by
civil war. I do not know of any documented case of a military figure enriched in civil war. Many
prominent politicians and soldiers of the century died poor: politics could certainly impoverish its
practitioners.
28 Details in Gartner (2005) and Gonza´lez Escobar (2002); von Schenk (1953, pp. 38 and 39)
notes that in Marmato, an important mining centre on the frontier between the two states, the
mine owners preferred to install the more costly machinery in the State of Antioquia and not in the
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The silver mine of Frı´as in Tolima, worked by an English company that
employed several hundred men at the end of the century, likewise suffered
little: work went on throughout the Thousand Days War, in part thanks to the
protection it enjoyed from the Liberal guerrilla General «El Negro» Marı´n,
previously employed by the mine as a capataz. Cauca mining declined with
the emancipation of the slaves, part of the conflicts of mid-century, but it is
doubtful that many economic historians will wish to place slave-owning
under the heading of insecure property rights. A counter-factual —
neo-institutionalist? — argument that Colombia would have developed faster
by maintaining slavery is for many reasons implausible29.
An obvious conclusion: the vulnerability of enterprises varied. Some large
Antioquen˜o mines had good defences: they were situated away from the
usual foci of fighting, and were not usually threatened with having their
workers recruited or with excessive exactions. Others may have suffered
more. Perhaps a closer look might discover evidence such as Stephen Haber
has found for Mexican mines during the Revolution, that what there inter-
ested governments and revolutionaries was a flow of resources, and for that
reason they had no interested in ruining enterprises that could provide such
a flow (Haber et al. 2003)30.
Neither tobacco, nor quinine nor coffee supports the thesis that insecurity
was the primordial obstacle that explains the slow and inadequate growth of
the 19th century economy.
The causes of the decline of tobacco were other: the loss of quality
through the exhaustion of the tobacco lands, the competition of Java, the
changing habits and tastes of European smokersy not civil war or anarchy.
Nor was the fortune of quinine or coffee determined by the ups and downs of
public order. The price of coffee, which did have something to do with those
ups and downs, did not depend on what passed in Colombia, but on what
was already a world market. The direction of causality, in the case of the war
of 1885, as has already been pointed out, ran from the fall in exports to
(F’note continued)
Cauca: Antioquia offered «better guarantees of life and property, even in times of war.» What I have
read about mining confirms Haber’s opinion: «y investors, first and foremost, care about the
sanctity of their property rights; they do not require governments to protect property rights as a
public good in order for investment to take place.» (Haber et al. 2003, p. 10).
29 For the Frı´as mine, Dickey (1929). The English in Tolima called Marı´n «the Colombian De
Wet», alluding to the famous Boer guerrilla chief in the contemporaneous South African War. They
refer to the local Tolima conflict in a sporting spirit. For more details on the Tolima mine, see
Fischer (2001, p. 86).
30 The damage to Mexican mining in the independence era and the prolonged decadence in
production that followed are a central element in John Coatsworth’s seminal article, and in the
chapter by Enrique Ca´rdenas in Haber (ed.) (1997) on the effects of disorder on Mexican devel-
opment. However, it is not altogether clear how much of this decline is to be attributed to the
neglect caused by war, the dislocation, flooding and flight of capital. Another problem was the
supply of mercury, as Coatsworth (1978) shows. The English who invested in Mexican mining in
the 1820s did not fail for lack of capital.
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disorder, not the other way round, and the same can be seen in the ante-
cedents of other wars, as in 1859 and 189931.
Coffee had a certain robustness, a natural capacity to survive in troubled
times. Coffee trees do not die, and after periods of neglect can be pruned
back into good shape. Coffee can be stored for long periods without any great
loss of quality. The armies never destroyed coffee plantations in the way the
ancient Greeks cut down the olive trees of their enemies. A war would
interrupt exports and cause a shortage of labour, but would not be a com-
plete disaster. After the War of a Thousand Days, once recovering prices
provided the incentive, the Colombian coffee industry recovered rapidly32.
Another sector to be looked at is transport.
There were some episodes of spectacular damage done to this sector,
symbolic damage, such as the destruction of the steamer Union in the
Magdalena River in 1840, during the Guerra de los Supremos. All the same,
the detailed studies show that steam navigation was established on the river
without much delay or difficulty when the available cargoes justified the
investment. This coincided with the export of tobacco, which provided the
downstream cargo and the earnings to pay for the increased imports that
came up. The river steamers were certainly exposed in times of revolution,
and there were many lost — the Battle of La Humareda, in the war of 1885,
was such a holocaust. But the steamers were surprisingly cheap, and were
soon replaced33. The wars also meant difficulties and increased costs in horse
and mule transport, and further interruptions in the efforts to build railways.
Here too my conclusion is to recognize the negative influence, but to deny it
any great importance.
Commerce too can be viewed as a sector. Frank Safford, in his thesis
on Bogota´ commerce in the century and in his account of the house of
Vargas Hermanos in Carlos Da´vila’s collection of entrepreneurial histories,
shows how that business confronted the risks and opportunities of civil war
31 The Federal Era of the Constitution of Rionegro, 1863-1885, one of pronounced decen-
tralization, was labelled by its critics «organized anarchy». It ended amid a crisis of the country’s
exports, but it cannot be written off as a period of general economic decline. For a contemporary
defence of its achievements, including material achievements, see Rocha Gutie´rrez (1887, pp. 53
et seq.). Garavito V. (1897) repeats another common lament, that it was lack of economic oppor-
tunity that intensified political competition to an excessive degree.
32 On the threats to a coffee hacienda in time of civil war and its techniques of survival, see my
essay on the Hacienda Santa Ba´rbara of Sasaima in Deas (1993). On the vulnerability of agriculture
in general, Haber refers to the lack of liquidity, the low level of fixed capital: there is nothing much
to sack in a traditional hacienda. Hyland (1983, p. 29) cites from von Schenk (1953) the case of the
destruction of 60,000 cacao trees by «los negros iracundos» — the furious blacks — of a hacienda
near Bugalagrande, but I have found no other example of such vengeance, and the number of trees
is suspiciously high.
33 See Means (1980) for details; my conclusion from reading this monograph is that the
Colombian legal institutions concerned with economic development — commercial justice, legal
codes, instruments of association, etc — may have been somewhat crude, but were more or less
adequate for the necessities of the time. For further discussion, see Safford (1965 and 2002).
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(Safford 1965 and 2002)34. There was the option of restricting activity and
holding the profits abroad until peace returned. There was the speculative
option: look for unusual gains by importing more in the knowledge that
competitors were importing less. Vargas Hermanos instructed their English
correspondents how to send the merchandize with an appearance of being
foreign property. The house did not always do badly out of civil war. In
addition, there was insurance: at one time of disturbance they concluded that
they were over-insuring, and that they had overestimated risk. They were not
carrying on business in such a primitive or anarchic context as might have
been supposed. In the phrase of Joseph Conrad’s Nostromo, «the conditions
of civilized business» were not entirely absent.
Each commercial centre of any importance had its circle of merchants
and businessmen, large or small, representatives of that international bour-
geoisie of the 19th century. As is well known, Colombia’s external trade in the
early years of independence was largely with Jamaica, and that then gave
way to direct trade with Europe. New Granadans made their contacts with
Manchester, with Paris, with Bremeny . They travelled for this purpose, or
sent family members to serve a commercial apprenticeship. They established
their reputations, their credit, in all senses of the word. This was an informal
freemasonry, sometimes reinforced by the formal version. Abroad, the
principal suppliers of the Colombian market became accustomed to the slow
commercial cycle and adjusted their terms to its distant realities35.
Trade was rarely or never completely interrupted, as the wars did not
affect all the territory, all the roads and rivers, all the ports. There are some
spectacular examples of open communication in times of civil war, one of
them the successful introduction in the middle of the War of a Thousand
Days of the heavy machinery for the country’s first sugar ingenio, La Manuelita,
which required an enormous train of bullocks, mules and men to transport
it from Buenaventura on the Pacific to Palmira in the Valle del Cauca. Just
as Colombian soldiers elaborated a specific art of warfare for the context,
merchants and entrepreneurs also adapted to the milieu36.
34 It is worth mentioning that wars and insecurity do not figure much in the histories of
entrepreneurs and enterprises in the two volumes of Da´vila L. de Guevara (2002).
35 For merchant freemasons, see Carnicelli (1975). The freemasonry of the time reinforced
trust, credit and confidence. There is no obvious evidence for an abnormal level of dishonesty
prevailing in the relations between Colombian merchants and their correspondents abroad, though
it is not easy to see where such evidence might be found. In at least one part of Colombia, Antioquia,
the culture of «my word is my bond» was notoriously strong: any man going back on a verbal
contract was ostracized. See Restrepo (1958). An extraordinarily complete description of the trade
conditions and customs of the country after a century of independent existence is Bell (1921).
36 For the ingenio La Manuelita, see Plazas y Perry Ltda. (1964), Eder (1959), London˜o (2004).
The persistence of commerce and of economic activity in general in time of war is worth stressing,
as are the particular opportunities war offers. For an unusual account with this focus, Corsan
(1996). Corsan travelled in both Confederate- and Union-held territory during the U.S. civil war,
with an eye to business. Much of the time, it was not in the interests of the combatants to impede it.
According to Nef (1950, p. 161) the French referred to trade in the midst of war as «la commerce
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One valuable source for evaluating specific economic losses caused by civil
war is the evidence from the claims made through diplomatic channels. They
cover not only the losses alleged by foreign nationals, but on occasion also what
are really the losses of native businessmen who have managed to cover
themselves with a foreign flag. Some of them are for sizeable amounts, and
from time to time they had painful consequences for the Colombian govern-
ment: events in Panama could be expensive, as was the «slice of melon riot»
and the burning of Colo´n by Pedro Presta´n in 1885; likewise the assassination
of some German merchants in Bucaramanga by the criminal-anarchist gang La
Culebra Pico de Oro, and the long-drawn-out Cerruti claim. Nonetheless, the
majority of claims were for small run-of-the mill losses. The British diplomats
complained of their compatriots’ tendency to exaggerate their losses, and made
it clear that they would not support excessive claims, nor claims that disguised
what was really native property. Their tone is often much more sympathetic
towards the Colombian government than towards the claimants37.
To round off this tour d’horizon of sectors, what of finance and banks?
First, and it is not exactly a sector, one has to consider the relation of public
finances to disorder. In a simplified version, the argument is that persistent
strife impedes imposing any order on the budget of the national government,
with dire consequences for national development: successive crises of public
order have among their results the consequence that the needs of the govern-
ment keep interest rates high in the local market to the prejudice of local
enterprise, and that they prevent any recourse to relief by borrowing abroad38.
They also restrict the government’s capacity for carrying out essential
improvements in the national infrastructure, upset the rate of exchange and at
times even lead to the sort of hyperinflation produced by the War of a Thousand
Days. The picture is of a vicious circle embracing the entire century.
(F’note continued)
pre´caire.» For business as usual, or for some perhaps better than usual, in a civil war in neigh-
bouring Venezuela, the Guerra Federal of 1859-1863, see the detailed observations in Nu´n˜ez de
Ca´ceres (1993): well-connected Caracas coffee hacendados made satisfactory arrangements with
insurgent leaders for getting in their harvests, sometimes employing the enemy troops, and for
bringing the coffee across the opposing lines. The war was far from affecting all the country, coffee
growing expanded, and before the close of the conflict there was a cotton boom brought on by
outbreak of the civil war in the United States. For Venezuela, see also Harwich Vallenilla (1988); the
estimates he quotes of loss of life in the war seem improbably high.
37 Presta´n was hanged by sentence of a Court Martial convened by General Rafael Reyes, in part
to placate the foreign merchant community and in the hope that that might moderate their sub-
sequent claims for losses. On the Culebra Pico de Oro, Garcı´a (1944), Acevedo Dı´az (1978). Cerruti
lost his stock — a lot of it one suspects the property of his Colombian partners — in the civil war of
1885, but the settlement of his large claim dragged on and only ended with a blockade of Colombian
ports by ships of the Italian navy on the eve of the War of a Thousand Days, a particularly awkward
time for the hard-up Colombian government. See Valencia Llano (1988) and (1993).
38 William Wills sets out this argument, see Deas (1996, vol. 2), but one must remember that
Wills wanted to be named Colombia’s fiscal agent in London. The details are in Junguito Bonnet
(1993) and in Avella Go´mez (2003).
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How can one put this argument into a more precise, and perhaps more
realistic, perspective?
The history of the foreign debt of the republic is one of a series of defaults
and renegotiations before it acquired a degree of stability in the first decade of
the 20th century. A prominent participant in the operations of the 1820s,
Colombia did not figure in the subsequent waves of 19th century lending to
Spanish America, as did for example Argentina and Chile. Was this a great
disadvantage? The day-to-day needs of the government were not large, and it
was easier, and perhaps more economical, to meet them in part through
recourse to internal borrowing: the advantages were that the lenders were close
at hand and the negotiations rapid; London was a long way away and financial
dealings there took their time, as well as implying a high political risk, as such
negotiations were always likely to be the target of wild criticisms and scandal39.
A simple conclusion is that for many years Colombian governments
preferred not to have recourse to borrowing abroad, as a result of fiscal
weakness which in part, but only in part, derived from internal disorder.
A counter-factual comes to mind: imagine a Colombia peopled by those
peaceful angels that Victor Hugo according to legend thought suitable citi-
zens for life under the libertarian 1863 Constitution of Rionegro, a Colombia
without the civil strife that caused defaults, and therefore enjoying better
credit abroad: what would have been the result?
With its weak fiscal base, the government’s capacity for borrowing would
have remained low. Its entrepreneurial capacity, its ability to put such
resources to profitable use, would have remained low as well, and it is
doubtful that the citizens of the country would have regarded grand gov-
ernment initiatives with much confidence. Those Colombians who preached
the virtues of laissez faire and minimal government now appear to me much
less utopian, much more realistic, than it has been the custom to judge them.
It is not at all clear as to what would have been the great works of national
progress that a 19th century government might have undertaken. There was
no general accord about priorities — that is shown by the eternal debate
about the merits of the Ferrocarril del Norte, a large undertaking, defended
as a national necessity, but one of dubious economic viability. One result of
39 Brazil was an exceptionally steady manager of her foreign debt. Summerhill (forthcoming)
analyses this punctuality in debt service and its results. He argues that this virtuous conduct did not
translate into rapid economic growth. In the course of his book, he questions a number of the
conclusions that North derived from his study of British finances. For Colombia, President Rafael
Nu´n˜ez confessed that the prospect of foreign debt negotiations always made him shiver. The British
Minister in Bogota´ wrote to London that Nu´n˜ez may or may not have been a «great man» but that
he was certainly as far as the foreign debt was concerned a «repudiator par excellence». Perhaps the
Colombian economy would have progressed marginally better paying less to the holders of the
foreign debt, but the recent study by Mauricio Avella shows that with successive defaults and
renegotiations the burden on the budget and on the economy in general soon became marginal. For
a unique account of the many vicissitudes and delays faced by a marginal South American republic
in renegotiating its debt in London, see Flores Jijo´n (1979).
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larger resources in government hands might have been a multiplication of
white elephants40.
At best, one can imagine some anticipation of the progress of the 1920s,
when the country did derive some advantage from the millions that came
with the first really prosperous decade in half a century. But even with the
new phenomenon of U.S. investment, those millions would not have come
without the previous advances in the economy, particularly the expansion of
coffee, and petroleum and bananas were essentially new commodities, of the
20th century, not the 19th century41.
*********************
Let us return to the thesis of Fernando Garavito, Influencia perniciosa de
las guerras civiles en el progreso de Colombia. It is a remarkable work for a
student of 1897, still worth reading, of a genuine concern for his country and
rich in suggestions, avoiding the temptation to find a single cause for its
instability. He makes observations on the climate of the tropics, and in
Colombia’s defence notes that the Guayanas, «populated by Frenchmen,
Englishmen and Dutch», have not progressed much either. He cites Rafael
Nu´n˜ez on the deplorable Colombian mania for taking French ideologies too
seriously. Among his criticisms of paper money, he lists the excessive facility
it gives the government for beginning ill-conceived undertakings. His cata-
logue of the evil consequences of civil war, moral and material, contains
much that is true. He certainly deserved his degree.
The economists who read him will take a particular interest in his
quantitative exercises, where he calculates the losses of the country through
deaths and disabilities from wounds, from the interruption of productive
activity, the cost of armies, the destruction of capital, etc. They are quite
sophisticated exercises, and their full analysis and criticism would be a
lengthy matter. One pernicious influence runs into another, and the total cost
rises and rises, to reach for example $1,200,000,000 for the suspension of
work alone. The reader ends up suitably depressed, as the writer intended
(Garavito 1897, p. 40).
40 Cf. Leff (1997) on Brazil: «Because of their geographical dispersion, political participants in
Brazil had very different preferences concerning the net benefits of potential public investment projects
that would be located in diverse provinces.» Frank Safford (2010) has emphasized the obstacles to
railway development in Colombia, which had much more to do with the geography of the country and
the wide dispersion of economic activities than with the weakness of public finances.
41 The 19th century petroleum market was embryonic. In the early years of the 20th century,
General Virgilio Barco began the exploitation of his famous concession with the idea of substituting
a national product for kerosene imported from the United States for domestic lighting on the
Atlantic Coast. The banana for mass consumption is likewise an innovation of the late 19th and early
20th century, dependent on innovations in transport and distribution. For bananas, see Kepner and
Soothill (1967) and Wilson (1947). Stephen Haber’s observation is pertinent here: «For an oppor-
tunity to be taken, it has to exist.»
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One principal reservation about this sort of exercise is that in the end one
does not know where to stop. Why limit oneself to wars? Why not add dis-
eases and epidemics, the cholera, the Spanish influenza of 1918, the plagues
of locusts and the ill effects of the ocean current El Nin˜o?42 The other is that
already mentioned, that if what we are trying to clarify is the progress or lack
of progress of the country in a comparative frame, then the same exercises
have to be carried out on the other countries of the comparison.
Some final reservations about the neo-institutionalists. The explanatory
power of the role of institutions in economic development seems to me still
limited, and I am confused by the tendency of some authors to extend the
boundaries of the notion of institution wider and wider, from the formal to
the informal, from something more or less well defined, such as the judicial
system, to the constitution and its workings, to the nature of the peasantry at
the time of Independence y to, according to one distinguished economic
historian of my acquaintance, the country’s geography and climate. For any
of this to be manageable, it has to be precise, and it has to make clear its
frontiers with other categories of explanation, such as the older and familiar
«factor endowments»43.
In the case of the Colombian economy and its evolution after indepen-
dence, I am inclined to share as a starting point Jose´ Antonio Ocampo’s
observations on the peasantry of the highlands and the lack of mobility of
labour, which incites me to go back to read those who wrote on the economy
around the time of the republic’s birth: Pedro Fermı´n de Vargas (1944),
Antonio Narin˜o (1797), Francisco Silvestre (1950), William Wills (1831).
Taken together, they describe very well the disadvantages then attending.
I remain sceptical about the connections between economic development, at
least in the crude dimensions such as gross domestic product and the growth
rate, and institutions. I do not see the connections so clearly, nor the direction of
causality in the changes, on one side and the other. Many institutions, such as
justice and security, the last the particular concern of this article, are desirable
in themselves, irrespective of their influence or lack of influence on the econ-
omy. This tends to be ignored when institutions are looked at by economists.
The old economic history, the «pre-institutional», still has a lot more to say
about the achievements and frustrations of Colombia’s 19th century.
42 The point about climate is made eloquently by A´lvarez (1914, pp. 153 et seq.) who correlates
for the 19th century the devastating effects of droughts with civil war and disorder: «Mientras
vivimos exclusivamente del pastoreo, la sequı´a destructora de ganados adquirio´ terrible impor-
tancia en nuestras querellas locales: arruinaba a los propietarios de campos y dejaba sin trabajo a
los peones, sumo´ esos elementos disponibles a la montonera.»
43 Some of the U.S.-Latin America comparisons in factor endowment that are current strike me
as too crude. As any entrepreneur knows, or will soon find out, small variations in seemingly similar
factors can mean the difference between success and failure. Large ones can sometimes be ignored.
A Colombian example: the Magdalena and the Mississippi are both rivers, but analysed as
endowments they differ in all sorts of ways.
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